Scipio’s African Campaign, 204-202 BC
The last years of the 3rd Century BC saw the finale to the 2nd Punic War, a war of supremacy between Rome and Carthage. Under the leadership of Publius Cornelius Scipio, Roman forces would mount a daring overseas expedition to Africa, defeat the great Carthaginian general Hannibal, and achieve what previous invasions could not – eliminate Carthage as a power. In doing so, the victory of Scipio ‘Africanus’ heralded 6 centuries of Roman Mediterranean dominance.
Welcome to Strategy Stuff, and this is the strategy of Scipio’s African Campaign.
Strategic Overview
Even before the 2nd Punic War, both Rome and Carthage recognized that their next fight would occur overseas: in Italy, in Spain, and in Africa – meaning modern Tunisia.
On paper, Carthage was better-prepared for this. Their income was up to 10 times that of Rome’s; they had done Mediterranean diplomacy for centuries, compared to Rome’s 50 years of experience; and their generals and mercenaries were used to long tours of duty overseas, as opposed to Rome’s system of raising new generals and soldiers annually.
But Rome had one major advantage: the quality and reliability of its Italian infantry, vastly superior to the Hellenistic phalanx that Carthaginian units still used. And the Romans had the good sense to maximize this advantage: first, they ordered their so-called ‘Italian allies’ to provide infantry for Roman armies; and second, they sought to turn as many realms of warfare as possible into infantry fights.
The most famous example of this is in naval warfare, where the Romans de-emphasized naval maneuver in favor of naval boarding action, which allowed their infantry to easily sweep the enemy away. These methods were vindicated in the 1st Punic War, where the Romans, despite having no maritime experience, nevertheless defeated the Carthaginian navy, seized its empire in Sicily and Sardinia, and became the dominant naval power in the Western Mediterranean.
Carthaginian Strategy
Carthage recognized Rome as a dangerous rival and developed a strategy to neutralize this threat. As soon as the 2nd Punic War broke out in 218, the Carthaginian general Hannibal set out on his famous trek from Carthaginian Spain, across the Alps, and into the Roman heartland of Italy. He planned to break Rome’s domination over the Italian cities, return the peninsula to its days of warring city-states, and in doing so reduce Rome back to irrelevance, too threatened by its neighbors to even think about Carthage.
Unfortunately for Hannibal, even his victory at Cannae wasn’t enough to get his strategy working. This wasn’t because of some bond between the Italian cities and Rome – in fact, Hannibal got almost every major city in Southern Italy, where he based himself. The problem was that the minor cities saw this, and decided that distant Roman rule was better than rule by their neighbors.
Under the pressure of war, Hannibal didn’t have the force nor time to build a pro-Carthaginian alliance that could push Rome out from even his section of Italy. As a result, Roman armies were free to operate around him, penning in and eventually neutralizing Hannibal as a serious threat. This is important to note, because the Romans would now face a similar dilemma in North Africa.
By 205, it was clear that Hannibal’s strategy had not only failed to defeat Rome, it had even failed to tie down Rome. Carthage continued to invade Italy, but Roman armies nevertheless still secured Sicily, warned off Macedon, and, under Scipio, conquered Spain. From the Carthaginian perspective, the 2nd Punic War was already lost.
But there was still hope for the future. Carthage’s overseas empire was again gone, but its dominance over its North African heartland still remained. Just like Rome in Italy, Carthaginian power over the independent Punic ports and the interior Libyan and Numidian peoples was not something an invader could easily overthrow. In time, the city could draw on these resources to rebuild its forces and challenge Rome in Round 3.
Maintaining control over North Africa was now Carthage’s main objective, and with this in mind, they awaited the Roman invasion.
Roman Strategy
Rome had always had a reckless attitude when it came to the idea of invading Africa, which reflected both their disdain for Carthage’s martial qualities, and also the intense competition between Roman clans for honors.
During the 1st Punic War, barely 5 years after they set out to sea, the Romans had already landed an army in Africa, which predictably got annihilated. Nevertheless, when the 2nd Punic War broke out, the Romans again prepared for an African invasion. Hannibal’s own invasion set things back by a decade, but as Roman armies demolished Carthage’s overseas empire, thoughts about Africa inevitably re-emerged.
In 205, Scipio, the conqueror of Spain, was elected as Roman consul for the year. His platform was simple: he would lead an army to invade Africa. He might have proposed this for strategic reasons, or for baser reasons of glory. In any case, there was little harm in trying: Hannibal was no longer a threat to Rome, nor was Carthage’s navy, and war debts were now being repaid thanks to the riches of Spain.
What’s clearer is that those opposed to Scipio’s African expedition did so for political reasons. They were led by Fabius Maximus, architect of the famous ‘Fabian’ strategy against Hannibal. As head of the esteemed Fabii clan, he – almost by tradition – had to reject the rival policies of Scipio’s equally-esteemed Cornelii clan. The level of opportunism can be seen in that Cato the Censor, later of ‘Carthage must be destroyed’ fame, actually sided with Fabius here instead of Scipio.
Fabius proposed a counter-strategy focused on Italy: not just throwing Hannibal’s army out of the Italian ‘Toe’, but also clearing Northern Italy of Celts and opening up the land for Roman settlement. Here, Fabius echoed the position of conservatives who wished only to reproduce existing Roman society. To them, conquering other quote-unquote ‘civilized’ lands – like Carthage and Greek Sicily – threatened to introduce foreign ideas and change. Again, Cato was an example of this, when he tried to impeach Scipio by claiming that he had adopted ‘Greek’ habits.
Cato’s attempt was only one of many by Scipio’s opponents to halt the expedition. First, they refused to base Scipio in Sicily; then they refused to raise an army for him; and finally, they tried to link him to one of his subordinate’s scandals.
Unfortunately for them, Scipio knew how to use his clan and his popularity. He threatened to take his case directly to the masses; his Senate friends rebuffed Fabius’ counter-proposals, and they also stuffed the team sent to investigate Scipio with his own allies. Ultimately, Fabius and Cato’s efforts failed, and Scipio was free to proceed with his African expedition.
Campaign Preparations
Despite his political confidence, Scipio recognized that an African invasion would be no cakewalk and would need meticulous preparation, which inevitably required time, effort and resources. To their credit, the Senate was willing to give him the time, keeping Scipio in command of the proposed expedition even after his term as consul expired.
Scipio was already known for his emphasis on military intelligence: he had famously captured the main Carthaginian base in Spain, by calculating that he could do so in a quick strike before enemy reinforcements arrived.
Intelligence gathering was underway by the time Scipio arrived at his staging base of Syracuse, mainly in the form of naval raids against the African coast. Such information was helpful, but offered few tips on how to proceed: Scipio’s biographers don’t mention this, but it’s likely that he would have studied the last two attempts at invading Africa: under the Greek Syracusan tyrant Agathocles in 310, and under the Roman consul Marcus Regulus in 256.
Agathocles stormed onto Africa with about 15 thousand men. For the next couple of years he was invincible, defeating Carthaginian armies, capturing Carthaginian towns, and securing the allegiance of a few Libyan leaders. But what he couldn’t do was siege Carthage itself, nor could he fully displace Carthage’s control over its Libyan and Numidian hinterlands. As a result, Agathocles was stuck in perpetual war, with the constant battles gradually bleeding his army dry. After 3 years, his force was finally crushed, and he had to flee back to Syracuse.
Marcus Regulus suffered an even quicker demise. Back then, the Romans had only 5 years of naval experience, and on top of that, the Senate decided to recall half the army after Regulus landed, leaving him with 15 thousand men. Despite this, Regulus still defeated Carthaginian armies and captured Carthaginian towns: but soon enough, he was again stumped before the triple walls of Carthage, with a pro-Carthaginian Numidia still harassing his rear. In the meantime, Carthage raised new troops, and crushed Regulus’ forces in the following year.
These brief overviews demonstrated that Carthage had an effective strategic system to defend their African heartland. It consisted of 3 components: first was overseas logistics, which limited any invading force to about 15 to 30 thousand men. Second was the city of Carthage, which was too big to be quickly captured with a force of that size – the Roman siege of Syracuse, a decade before Scipio’s expedition, still took 2 grueling years despite better logistics and a smaller city.
Third was Carthage’s overall predominance over its Libyan and Numidian neighbors: sure, some might defect, but not all of them, which meant that any invader would be slowly bled dry by the persistently-hostile environment. By contrast, the Carthaginians, secure behind their walls, would gather new armies from the hinterland and eventually mop up the remnants.
One of these three components would have to be broken if the Roman invaders were to even survive, much less achieve victory. But in fact, Scipio believed that he had already broken one of them: a year ago, as Scipio was finishing up the Spanish conquest, he had begun secret talks with 2 of the most prominent leaders in Numidia – Syphax in the west and Masinissa in the east. While both were actively fighting each other, they were also equally tired of Carthaginian domination and were interested in Rome as a potential counterbalance.
As an incentive, they offered to provide Scipio with Numidian cavalry, whose mobility would greatly enhance Roman tactical capabilities. But more importantly, with a local ally holding down the hinterland, Scipio could greatly reduce the level of attrition his army would suffer and thereby enhance his ‘staying power’ in North Africa, even while robbing Carthage of the ability to continuously summon in new reinforcements. All this would allow the Romans to eventually threaten the Carthaginians with the possibility of a long but inevitably-successful siege and therefore force the latter to finally admit defeat.
With this strategy in mind, Scipio began work to ensure that his army could survive on distant shores. He took the political risk of delaying the invasion until after his term as consul, correctly trusting that his political allies could fend off Fabius, renew his command and prevent Roman aggression elsewhere, notably against the recent enemy Macedon.
The Senate refused to raise an army for Scipio, but let him raise 7 thousand volunteers and additionally sent another 7 thousand from Italian allies. He also had the pick of the 2 ‘Cannae legions’ stationed in Sicily, made up of the exiled survivors from Hannibal’s victory and by now, the most experienced soldiers Rome had. From these, Scipio picked 25 thousand soldiers and 1 thousand cavalry for his expedition.
The next 18 months were spent maintaining the navy, stockpiling supplies and crucially, army training: not just to get his soldiers working together, but also to teach them about new tactics. Scipio wanted tactical maneuverability from his formations – especially the ability to reform infantry lines mid-battle, as opposed to just pushing forward.
The Carthaginians made no move to disrupt Scipio, though they did land in Northern Italy to try and draw off some Roman forces. By the end of his preparations, Scipio’s army was described as one of the best Rome ever sent into war; and the rest of the campaign would rely on his ability to deal with contingencies and changes. Unexpectedly, the first one came before Scipio had even set sail.
The First Phase, 204-203 BC
On the eve of Scipio’s expedition, a message came bearing almost the worst possible news for him. While the Romans were preparing, the Numidian leader Syphax had chased off his rival Masinissa, leaving the former as the only relevant leader left. But the growth of Syphax’s power had also given him leverage with Carthage, who now offered concessions and a marriage alliance. Satisfied with the new political balance, Syphax accordingly told Scipio that their deal was off, and that his Numidians would return to being Carthaginian allies.
In an instant, Scipio’s strategy was completely shattered, with his planned campaign now lacking local support and therefore becoming extremely risky. He now had to decide whether to proceed with it at all, and to do so under extreme time pressure: once word of Syphax’s re-defection leaked to Rome, his political enemies in the Senate would almost certainly seek to once again hold up or even cancel the entire expedition.
To Scipio, there was only one real choice, and it wasn’t to humiliate himself by backing out of his only political platform. Instead, he announced that Syphax was actually urging him to invade, and as such the entire army would sail for Africa immediately. As such, Scipio’s campaign began with its commander having no plan to beat the Carthaginian defensive system, and essentially gambling that his leadership, preparation, and soldiers would see everybody through.
Decisions now had to be made on the fly. Scipio may have wanted to land east of Carthage: after all, the previous invasions he likely read about had landed there, giving the advantage of familiarity. But without Syphax, Scipio had no choice but to call on the one local ally he still had left: Masinissa, who was by now less a leader and more a fugitive. They agreed to meet on the coast west of Carthage, near the ‘second city’ of its African heartland, Utica.
The Carthaginian navy did not contest Scipio’s sea journey nor the landing, knowing that while they were the better sailors, the Romans had the superior naval tactics; besides, the sea was not where Carthage planned to destroy the Roman army anyway. Scipio’s army quickly routed local reconnaissance and first-response forces, while the Carthaginians mobilized soldiers, prepared for siege and asked Syphax to provide aid.
The first hurdle of the Carthaginian defense system now lay before Scipio. Utica was smaller than Carthage, its port would make a good supply depot, and its walls would provide protection should the Romans need to evacuate. As such, Scipio saw it as a good place to test his army.
He was to be sorely disappointed. Throughout the summer and fall, and despite Scipio’s siege preparations, Utica stubbornly held out until the Romans had to retreat for winter. Scipio’s contingency plan was to build a wooden fort near his landing beach, but this was a frankly terrible start to his campaign.
Even worse, while Scipio was stuck before Utica, the Carthaginians smoothly joined up with Syphax’s Numidians to form a force about twice the size of Scipio’s army. They then proceeded to box the Romans in by setting up camps near Scipio’s fort, intending to use them as bases from which to begin wearing down Scipio’s army.
Faced with the prospect of repeating Agathocles’ and Regulus’ disasters, Scipio resorted to deception. Claiming to want a peaceful exit, Scipio not only secured a winter truce, but also instructed his ‘negotiation teams’ to scout out the Punic camps. Then in spring 203, he abruptly ended both negotiations and truce, assembling his army in an apparent attempt to re-siege Utica. Instead, he launched a night attack, splitting his forces to burn the Carthaginian and Numidian camps. While such deviousness seemed un-Roman even to Scipio’s supporters, the results were undeniable – both the Carthaginian and Numidian armies were massacred.
Despite the victory, Scipio’s strategic situation still hadn’t improved – his army was still stuck between impregnable city walls and a hostile hinterland. Moreover, within a month, the Carthaginians and Numidians were already raising another army, though due to the greener quality of this 30-thousand-strong force, they decided to assemble further away in a sector of the African interior known as the ‘Great Plains’. There they hoped to reorganize, refit and train themselves, while Scipio’s army wasted away before Utica.
In an example of his impressive intelligence work, Scipio quickly learned of this new force. Nevertheless, its location might still have given him pause: even with the local knowledge provided by his weak ally Masinissa, the Romans would still be splitting their army to fight deep inside enemy country, with total annihilation a likely outcome in the event of defeat.
Again, Scipio decided to take a major risk. The Carthaginian army would eventually come after him anyway, and it seemed better to strike while it was still unprepared. Furthermore, a victory might open up some new opportunities – opportunities Scipio absolutely needed right now to get out of this strategic rut. The Romans therefore marched to the Great Plains.
Scipio’s gamble turned out to be wildly successful, with his army winning an easy victory and wiping out another Carthaginian army. Furthermore, his soldiers were now at the borders of Masinissa’s old realm, with neither Carthage nor Syphax in much of a position to do anything about them. Scipio accordingly decided to split his force even further, detaching troops on Masinissa’s request to invade Numidia and install his ally onto the throne.
This decision made the entire campaign. Having demonstrated the tactical prowess of the Italian infantry, Scipio now leveraged that reputation to generate a diplomatic and strategic revolution, as the Roman detachment smoothly returned Masinissa’s territory to his control as they pursued Syphax. Even better, Syphax eventually decided to make a final stand at his capital, only to be defeated, captured, and his territory also given to Masinissa. Almost overnight, Carthage’s hinterland turned into a Roman client.
With their traditional dominance over Numidia not just gone, but replaced by Roman dominance, the Carthaginian defensive system fell apart. Scipio was no longer in a hostile land, and while his small force posed no real threat to Carthage’s walls, it could now blockade and siege the city for as long as he pleased.
After a face-saving raid against Scipio’s fort, Carthage sued for peace. A new truce was declared, Scipio issued his terms, and a peace embassy was sent to Rome. But at the same time, the Carthaginians also decided to imitate Scipio’s earlier attempts at deception: taking advantage of the temporary peace, they sent messages recalling their overseas armies – including Hannibal – back to Africa, intending to launch a last-ditch attempt to reclaim their hinterland.
Zama, 203-202 BC
As soon as the Roman Senate received news of the truce and especially the Carthaginian recalls, it ordered local forces to prevent Hannibal leaving Italy. They were too late: the Carthaginian general, aware of the grave situation back home, had immediately set sail with the better part of his army, even if it meant abandoning his weaker soldiers and most notably, his horses.
As intended, Hannibal’s return prompted the Carthaginians to end the truce and resume the war. In any case, they had little left to lose: without the African hinterland as a core component of their defensive system, Carthage would become little better than a Roman vassal. Given Hannibal’s reputation, it wasn’t too fanciful to expect him to crush Scipio, restore Carthaginian control over Numidia, and revert the war with Rome back to a strategic stalemate.
Hannibal did his best. The army he had included Italian veterans, hired mercenaries, and local Carthaginian levies, as well as new horses and elephants – and they all needed to be trained. Hannibal did so throughout the winter of 203, but he needed more time.
Scipio refused to give him that time. As spring 202 dawned, the Romans marched out of their base and began systematically ravaging the Carthaginian countryside: destroying farmland, enslaving people, and pressuring the political authorities to act. It worked, and Carthage ordered Hannibal to attack.
Hannibal marched his 45 thousand men inland beyond the town of Zama, hoping to obtain more cavalry from Syphax’s remnants. Instead, he found Scipio and Masinissa’s army ready to intercept him. Despite Hannibal’s tactical innovations – including the deployment of a tactical reserve – there was not much his half-trained, cavalry-deficient army could do against Scipio’s well-drilled soldiers. Scipio’s Italian infantry destroyed the newer Carthaginian troops, while Masinissa’s Numidian cavalry destroyed the veterans. With them went any hope of Carthaginian recovery.
Scipio could have followed up his victory with a siege of Carthage, doing what Rome would accomplish fifty years later. But he decided not to, reopening peace talks with the Carthaginians instead. Here, Scipio might not have been entirely magnanimous – he knew that one of the consuls was sailing over to quote-unquote ‘reinforce’ him, and it might have been in fear of this interloper stealing his glory that pushed him to offer peace.
In any case, Carthage had no choice but to give up all claims to power: no navy besides 10 ships, no overseas empire, and essentially no African expansion either, since Carthage would need Rome’s permission for any local wars, which in any case would have been fought against the Roman ally Masinissa.
The Romans couldn’t resist making one last strategic error, however: they imposed what they thought was a crippling indemnity that would take Carthage 50 years to pay back, only for the city to do so in 10 years. Even so, this shrunken, vulnerable Carthage no longer posed any real threat, and in fact, could only passively await the fate that Rome planned for it.
Conclusion
Scipio’s African expedition showcased both the worst and the best of strategymaking under the Roman Republic. On the one hand, the short-termism and hyper-competitiveness of its political system encouraged Roman commanders to recklessly gamble rather than manage risks, yet it also drove them to relentlessly create, identify and exploit strategic opportunities. Underlying all these was the confident assumption that even severe mistakes and risks could be overcome by the sheer superiority of the Roman military system, whose Italian infantry could reliably grind out wins no matter the strategic situation.
Throughout his invasion of Africa, Scipio Africanus’ meticulous planning, strategic perception and innovative execution contributed much to the final Roman triumph. But he was frankly and deliberately flirting with disaster throughout much of his campaign, and the main reason it did not become one was that the Roman army was simply much better than its opponents, and would largely remain so for the next 6 hundred years.
*
Thanks for watching the video, and please like, subscribe and hit the bell button! If you have any questions, I’ll be happy to answer them in the comments section.
No comments:
Post a Comment