Tuesday, May 5, 2020

SCRIPT - Geostrategy of the Peloponnesian War, Part 5: Politics and Strategy (27/01/2020)




Hi, and welcome to Strategy Stuff. This is a video series I originally made for CaspianReport on the geostrategic analysis of the Peloponnesian War. In the fourth video, we looked at how competing Athenian and Spartan strategies finally culminated in a Spartan victory in the final phase of the War. Now, we conclude the series by looking at how politics influenced Athenian and Spartan strategymaking.
 
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I. National Character
One of the themes in Thucydides’ History revolves around the influence of ‘national character’ on strategymaking. According to the historian, all states share the same two goals: the desire to be free from domination, and also the desire to dominate others. Even so, states clearly don’t behave in the same way: throughout the Peloponnesian War, Athens campaigned aggressively around Greece, whereas Sparta acted only under the most pressing or favorable circumstances.

The difference is explained through national character, which determines a state’s perception and acceptance of risk. In a purely rational world, strategic risk can be objectively calculated from observable facts, but Thucydides recognized that the very act of observing reality is not entirely rational. Instead, observation is influenced by subjective phenomena like historical memory, pre-existing biases, and the tendency to focus on particular items. In this way, the Peloponnesian War pitted two national characters against each other: Athenian optimism versus Spartan pessimism.

National characters are based on geography. Athenian optimism came about through the poverty of Athens’ home soil, which encouraged people to be proactive in order to prosper. The result was a national character that accepted a high level of strategic risk, celebrating bold strategies with high potential payoffs, even to the extent of overlooking, downplaying or ignoring the dangers that lurked in the details.

Athenian strategy was therefore aggressive, unorthodox, and not entirely planned out, leaving practical execution dependent on the hands of a hopefully-competent leader. Cleon’s strategic offensive against Sparta, for example, delivered spectacular results with Demosthenes’ operational package, but under alternate leadership at Delium resulted in ineffectiveness and defeat. On the upside – and the Athenians were conditioned to see only the upside – such strategies could wrongfoot the enemy and generate significant gains. But on the downside, the Athenian approach also de-emphasized cost-benefit considerations, and relied on inspired leadership instead of detailed planning, which, if the stars failed to align, would inevitably lead to avoidable catastrophes like Sicily.

By contrast, Spartan pessimism came from the fertility of Spartan lands, which fostered a national character that was not sold on the benefits of change. Sparta’s national character therefore accepted only minimal levels of risk, and rather than maximizing potential payoffs, they focused on minimizing potential losses. Inaction was technically a way of avoiding loss, and so Sparta often fell into strategic paralysis, acting only once the potential losses from inaction – like losing hegemony – became truly unacceptable.

Even then, Spartan strategies followed tried-and-tested formulae, like seeking quick decisive battle even before the walls of Athens. Their predictable plans made it easy for enemies to counter or surprise them, as Athens did throughout the first half of the War. But the flip side of this was that Spartan strategies were well-planned and carefully executed: they would, for example, always secure the support of a local ally before campaigning abroad, and despite their militaristic reputation, rarely staked the success of their campaigns on an equal-strength battle. As demonstrated at Mantinea and throughout the Ionian War, the Spartans were masters of the art of strategic patience, able to hold off on action until circumstances guaranteed a low-cost victory.

In this way, national character explains why states have different strategies; but Thucydides’ analysis goes further than that. He sees an inherent tension in the strategymaking process: strategies that fit with national character are naturally more likely to get adopted, but those same strategies would also inherit national weaknesses and sow the seeds for eventual defeat.

Instead, great strategies challenge national character to balance out national weaknesses. Pericles’ decision to stay behind the walls ran counter to Athenian optimism, but prevented the city from gambling on a risky decisive battle. Brasidas’ Northeastern campaign could have resulted in terrible loss, but it saved Sparta from the strategic paralysis it had sunk into. For Thucydides, both men exhibited the two qualities of great strategists: firstly, the wisdom to correctly identify national character, and secondly, the ability to turn unpopular plans into reality.

II. Strategymaking Institutions
Moving on from Thucydides, we look at how both Athens and Sparta structured the process of strategymaking within their governments, and how that influenced the end result.

Here, we tackle a specific criticism directed at Greek institutions, namely what one scholar dubbed the “over-responsibility of the executive”. It argues that Greek strategymaking was too centralized, both with the home government micromanaging the planning of campaigns, and also holding field commanders criminally responsible if the execution of said campaigns turned out different, no matter the reason.

The criticism of over-responsibility is almost always directed at Athenian democracy and is habit of eliminating its own military talent. The prime example here was the Trial of the Generals after the Battle of Arginusae in 406. After that hard-won naval victory, a storm prevented the 8 victorious admirals from saving drowning sailors; and for that, the enraged Athenians convicted and executed 6 of them. With such strict rulings and harsh punishments, it is little wonder that Athenian generals often acted politically rather than strategically, such as when Nicias wasted his army before Syracuse rather than trusting his instinct to leave.

In thinking about this criticism, we should first recognize that over-responsibility was probably a built-in feature of Athenian government. When it came to strategy, the legislative branch of the Athenian Assembly was solely in charge of planning, voting on details such as what diplomacy to undertake and even where to campaign. Execution was the responsibility of 10 Generals, elected by the Assembly on an annual basis. To supervise them, each General was subject to a monthly vote of confidence and a review at the end of their term. Failing either would get one sent before the Popular Tribunal, where trials were not so much about the law as they were about one’s popularity with the jury. Conviction would carry sentences up to death. From this overview, we can see that Athenian over-responsibility was part of a broader institutional choice to prioritize political control over strategic effectiveness. The Assembly was the sole decisionmaker, and any field commander who thought differently risked being politically and physically removed.

This undoubtedly led to frustrating episodes like at the naval Battle of Sybota in 433: the small Athenian fleet was instructed to defend Corcyra from Corinth, but not to actually join in the battle that was already raging between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians; instead, it was to suicidally attack the Corinthian armada only after the Corcyraeans had already lost, and the victorious Corinthians were about to land on the island itself!

Of course, there was a good reason behind this crazy order – Corcyra was Athens’ ally, but Corinth at this time was still neutral towards Athens. And since angering either state would damage Athens’ geopolitical interests, the city justifiably wanted to delay making a choice for as long as possible. This, in turn, reflects an understanding that Greece in the 5th Century BC was an intensely competitive geopolitical environment, where the distance between a comfortable hegemony and fighting an overwhelming coalition was not that large. To thrive, Athens needed to make careful choices with the bigger picture in mind – responsibilities that could not be entrusted to a local field commander.

And it wasn’t just Athens who thought this way – Sparta had its own version of over-responsibility. The city had 2 Kings to act as army leaders, but responsibility for planning fell again to the legislative branch, which in Sparta was split between 5 ephors elected annually, and an Elder Chamber of 28 elders elected for life. The King on campaign had to execute the approved strategy to the letter, with 1 ephor personally supervising him to make sure. Kings could be punished for exercising their own judgment: prior to the Mantinea campaign in 418, King Agis II, wary of Athenian reinforcements, decided not to seek battle with Argos, and for that he was threatened with a severe fine and the destruction of his property.

Spartan over-responsibility again reflected the prioritization of political control over military effectiveness: the Spartan navy might have avoided both its destructions, for example, were the Spartan naval commander not replaced annually. But the Spartan government had good reason to overrule its commanders: both King Archidamus’ father and co-ruler had been exiled for accepting treasonous bribes, and Brasidas’ Northeastern campaign saw the general callously break the alliance with Macedon and the truce with Athens, even as Sparta’s truce with Argos was about to expire.

For Sparta and Athens, therefore, war was far too important to be left to the generals, and the criticism of ‘executive over-responsibility’ was, in fact, an attempt to optimize strategic decisionmaking in a competitive environment. That said, Sparta never abused its over-responsibility in so frivolous a fashion as Athens repeatedly did, and in the next section, we try to find the reasons why.

III. Athens: Strategy in a Divided Society
When we examine Athenian democracy’s more questionable decisions, we seem to find a common characteristic running through them: the decision made was either often quickly reversed, or the Athenians would quickly begin to “repent” their decision. That suggests a society evenly and deeply divided over policy – at least in practice, since the urban-dwellers in Athens had a much easier time voting, and were therefore overrepresented compared to the farmers living far away.

Athens’ policy divides were laid on top of socioeconomic differences. Athenian society was officially structured into 4 classes: the great landowners, the wealthy equestrian class, the small landowners, and the poor. The higher the class, the more likely your income came from owning land; the lower the class, the more likely your income came from overseas trade.

Class interest therefore incentivized a sharp divide in strategic policy. Since war with Sparta would inevitably see its soldiers pillage Athenian land, the higher classes naturally preferred conciliation with Sparta, especially if it meant giving away a maritime empire which they had little stake in anyway. By contrast, the lower classes recognized that expanding Athens’ overseas empire would also expand the market for their goods and services; and indeed, for the urban poor, war with Sparta was a safe way of earning easy money in Athens’ invincible navy. And as the Athenian empire expanded, the city would have to send more colonists to garrison strategic and rebellious points – and coincidentally enough, the reward for being a state-sponsored colonist was being given land and climbing up the social ladder.

It is little wonder, then, that the aristocratic Nicias would be a consistent advocate of peace with Sparta, while Cleon, as a champion of the poor, would instead demand harsh measures against tributaries and Sparta alike. But since the poor inevitably outnumbered the rich, one might expect Athenian strategy to be uniformly skewed in a maritime and anti-Spartan direction.

But this was not the case. When Athenian democracy first emerged in the 500s BC, the system, by design or compromise, had various institutional checks to prevent unfettered rule by the poor. Formally, the poor could vote on policy, but policy execution was reserved for the higher classes, and only the great landowners could serve in an Elder Chamber with the power to veto anything in the democracy. Informally, because there was no remuneration for taking time off to vote, poor turnout was suppressed and the rich were over-represented. The result was that the rich were often able to counterbalance the maritime tendencies of Athenian strategy, restricting expansion to what was needed to continue the fight against Persia.

This aristocratic ‘Deep State’ naturally angered the poor, and so they turned to none other than Pericles as their champion. By the 450s, Pericles had successfully stripped the Elder Chamber of its political power, let the poor serve in policy execution, and also started paying people to vote. This was the era of Athenian ‘radical democracy’, and as policy tilted decisively in favor of the poor, Athenian strategy accordingly raced down a maritime and anti-Spartan path, quickly resulting in not just the First Peloponnesian War, but also increased friction with imperial tributaries and peer competitors alike.

Now to be fair, Sparta’s envy and fear of Athens had been increasing even before the radical democracy, and as previous videos have shown, Athenian leaders believed that they could neutralize whatever damage Sparta could inflict. But by catering so exclusively to the poor’s class interest, radical democrat strategy gave the richer classes a material incentive to take back policy control. War might be profitable for the poor, but for the rich, it definitely meant seeing their villas destroyed, collection of rents interrupted, and being more heavily taxed to fund military expenses.

Under the radical democracy, the rich had no institutional path back into power, so inevitably, they began working outside of the system, destabilizing Athens’ strategymaking in the process. During the Mytilenean debate, they counter-mobilized against Cleon’s policy of mass execution, generating a 180 degree turn in Athenian policy. Right before the Sicilian Expedition, they carried out a political hit job on Alcibiades, using the vandalism of religious statues as their pretext. And finally, after the Sicilian debacle, they overthrew Athens’ democracy itself in 411, throwing the city into turmoil just as Sparta took to the seas.

Even within the system, the unbalancing of Athens’ democracy created negative strategic consequences. With the poor now the dominant political bloc, strategic advocacy now became a matter of staking out extreme pro-poor positions in order to win votes. Pericles’ prestige allowed him to exercise strategic moderation, but his successors Cleon and Hyperbolus were either unwilling or politically unable to exercise such restraint. Instead, they advocated for more war, both to buy the support of the poor and to demonize their opponents as unpatriotic. Under such an environment, strategic discussion in the Assembly became little better than an echo chamber: in particular, during the Sicilian Expedition and the Trial of the Generals, dissenting Athenians were compelled to shut up instead of voicing opposition, for fear that the Assembly would turn against them as well.

To sum up, therefore, we can trace the strategic failures of Athens back to Pericles’ decision to remove the aristocratic checks on Athenian democracy, which, through internal self-radicalization and external turmoil, fatally compromised the city’s ability to make good strategy. To think about what could have been done differently, we consider what Thucydides saw as the best government in his lifetime, the moderate oligarchy of ‘The 5,000’.

‘The 5,000’, more likely than an actual number, probably referred to the class of small landowners and farmer-soldiers, who served as hoplites in times of war and probably dominated this government. Perhaps because of this, Thucydides saw them as representing a disciplined and patriotic ‘Golden Mean’ between the selfish treason of Athens’ wealthiest and the irresponsible decisionmaking of Athens’ poorest.

The brief record of the 5,000 seems to justify Thucydides’ assessment. As Athens’ democracy was replaced by oligarchy in the 411 coup, some of the richer oligarchs wanted to bolster their rule by inviting Sparta into Athens. Seeing this, the moderate oligarchs of the 5,000 turned on their former allies and prepared to take over the city. One way of doing so would have been to summon the Athenian fleet back to the city, but that would have resulted in what was left of the Athenian Empire defecting wholesale to Sparta. Instead, the 5,000 took up arms themselves against the extremist oligarchs, while the Athenian fleet under Alcibiades was allowed to pursue the Spartan fleet until the latter’s destruction at Cyzicus in 410. Having stabilized Athens’ strategic situation with that victory, the 5,000 seems not to have retained power for long, instead handing power back to the radical democracy in an uneventful transition.

For Thucydides, the disciplined moderation of the 5,000 allowed them to make clear-headed strategic decisions, self-sacrifice for the greater good, and wield power only for public benefit. Again like in the previous section on national character, a balanced temperament, whether in person or as a collective, is key to good strategy.

IV. Sparta: the Perils of Over-Mobilization
As we think about the impact of politics on Spartan strategymaking, a good starting-point would be to re-interpret King Archidamus’ recommended strategy – reforming Sparta’s economy, opening up to foreigners and especially flooding Sparta with money – as, in fact, a veiled warning, meant to demonstrate that Sparta could not defeat Athens without corrupting the values that lay at the heart of Spartan communalism. The mobilization required to fight such a prolonged war would inevitably introduce changes to Spartan politics, Spartan strategy and, eventually, Spartan society.

Traditional Spartan society was famous for its exclusiveness. People living outside Sparta were either helot serfs or subjects without rights, but to be an actual citizen even within Sparta itself, one not only had to trace ancestry back to a founding citizen, but also had to be rich enough to contribute to the communal granary.

This exclusivity was the root cause of Sparta’s perennial headache – the persistent decrease in the citizen population. This was not just a question of childbirths, but also a politico-economic issue. Spartan conservatism naturally recoiled at the prospect of using government to smooth out social inequalities, but the result was that Sparta’s great landowners gradually squeezed out smaller farmers, causing the latter to fail their granary obligations and thus lose their citizenship. And because citizens formed the core of Sparta’s military and governance structure, their decline meant that Sparta’s ability to project power shrank by the year.

But from a strategic viewpoint, this was not a wholly negative outcome. As mentioned in the earliest videos, Sparta was not a typical hegemon that ruled by virtue of a dominant economic base. Instead, Sparta’s hegemony came from its superior army, and its ability to deploy said army in a targeted fashion, so as to force or convince much larger cities to accept its rule. In practice, this meant that Sparta had to be restrained in its use of force: constant fighting would not only erode the army’s qualitative edge, but also make other states wary of Sparta and less inclined to view its hegemony as something benign and distant. Happily for Sparta, the leaders of the gradually-weakening city were naturally incentivized to look beyond military force as a solution to their strategic problems.

This whole system, however, would come under unbearable pressure as Sparta struggled to respond to Athens’ aggressive strategy under Cleon. Unwilling to risk any more Spartan citizens after Sphacteria, Sparta began mobilizing hitherto-unused segments of its society. Now, Sparta had always utilized non-citizens – particularly ex-Spartans – in its army, but now, the gates were opened further to allow helots and ex-helots to become soldiers, most famously in Brasidas’ Northeastern campaign, but also in the relief of Syracuse, and in Sparta’s new fleet. Almost overnight, despite the long-term damage this did to Sparta’s economy, the city’s ability to project power across Greece had seemingly rejuvenated.

The obvious result arising from this mobilization of non-citizens was the creation of a new political force within Spartan politics. As non-citizens earned prestige through military service, they inevitably began to demand rights comparable to that of proper citizens. In this, they were most notably assisted by Lysander, a non-citizen himself, who established his own power base by appointing non-citizens as military governors over the former Athenian Empire. Lysander was even willing to sacrifice Spartan interests to get his way, persuading Persia to cut off funds to the Spartan fleet when a traditionalist was appointed as his successor, resulting in its destruction at Arginusae. Others attempted to contribute by destabilizing the Spartan system, most notably in the assassination and coup attempt of the Kinadon Conspiracy of 399.

That said, political intrigue was nothing new in Sparta and if a new faction was the only result from Spartan mobilization, the system could probably have managed it in due course. However, increasing Sparta’s ability to use force also loosened the constraints that prevented Sparta from resorting to force. And this, combined with the aforementioned political competition, would prove to be the downfall of the Spartan hegemony.

Freed from the pressures of geopolitical competition, Sparta’s leadership began externalizing its internal political disputes. Leadership contests that, in previous years, might have assumed the form of corruption charges or some other non-military process, now took the form of invading other states in order to build up political capital. To counter Lysander’s great prestige, King Pausanias allowed Athenian democrats to overthrow Lysander’s oligarchy in 403, while King Agis II invaded Elis in 401. To counter these counters in turn, Lysander successfully convinced Sparta to fight Persia from 397-94, and when the political result was not to his liking, he and King Pausanias invaded Thebes in 395, sparking off the next round of hegemonic wars in Greece.

Lost in all of this political infighting was the fundamental geostrategic understanding that Sparta’s overtaxed economic base could not afford all these wars, nor fend off the increasing hostility of the Greek cities who now saw Sparta as an interventionist bully. Sparta’s mobilization of non-citizens during the Peloponnesian War should have been temporary; instead, prolonged over-mobilization accelerated Sparta’s economic, and by extension citizenship, decline. In 425, about half of Sparta’s soldiers were still citizens; by 371, only 10% were. In the meantime, Sparta’s hegemony would be propped up thanks to Persian support, but the stage was set for its sudden collapse at the hands of Thebes.

V. Conclusion
In this video, we’ve looked at various ways in which Greek politics influenced strategy during and after the Peloponnesian War. In Thucydides’ concept of ‘national character’ and his assessment of Athenian politics, we see a characteristically Greek approval of moderation, whether for a person, a strategy or for a political system. One thing that Greek states were certainly not moderate about, however, was in their insistence on centralized control over strategy, justifiable given the need to tread carefully in a competitive environment. But centralization also exposed strategymaking to the turbulence of domestic politics – Athens’ unbalanced radical democracy was the root cause of much of the city’s strategic mistakes and instability, while Sparta’s over-mobilization eventually saw its leadership lose sight of the fundamental principles that made the city a power in the first place. If Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, then Sparta similarly lost the resulting peace; and hegemonic wars would continue to plague Greece until the rise of Macedon.

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If you liked this video, please do give a like and subscribe. If you have any questions, I’ll be happy to answer them in the comments section. This is the final video of a longer video series I originally made for CaspianReport. Also check out my Facebook page, where I review the literature and post some additional thoughts regarding the video.

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