Sir Julian Corbett, Limited
War, and a Strategy for Maritime States
Introduction
This video
will be about Sir Julian Corbett, an early 20th Century British
naval theorist, and his application of the ‘Limited War’ concept to sea power
and the strategy of maritime states, which are societies closely linked with the
sea. Corbett argues that maritime states should wage war in a fashion different
from their continental counterparts – one based on sea control, strategic
isolation, and the cost-effective application of force.
Corbett’s ideas,
laid out in his 1911 book Some Principles
of Maritime Strategy, can be seen as his answer to the following question:
why was Britain able to defeat larger European rivals and rise to prominence? This
was a question that needed answering as Britain on the eve of WWI once again
faced larger and better-resourced states, not just Germany but also Russia and
the United States.
On a
theoretical level, Corbett also sought to re-introduce leaders to what he saw
as a ‘British Way of War’, which he feared was being ignored in favor of a
Continentalist outlook. Continentalism argued that Britain needed a large army,
capable of taking on its Continental counterparts, in order to safeguard its interests.
For Corbett, such an outlook threatened to drag Britain into a war of attrition
that would not only be costly but also unwinnable, given its smaller population
and declining relative industrial strength. Rather, Britain should re-connect
with its traditional methods, where small British forces supported by naval
power were able to generate effects in excess of their numbers.
In order to
lay the theoretical foundations for such a method, Corbett turns to Prussian
war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s idea of ‘Limited War’.
Absolute War vs Limited War
Writing in
the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz is known and stereotyped for
his use of ‘Absolute War’ as the ideal form of conflict. In a war of unlimited
political aims where the loser stands to lose everything, the enemy will only
surrender when he has been disarmed. Rather than bleeding him dry, Clausewitz argues
that it is more efficient to attempt the enemy’s disarmament by pitting one’s
entire force against his in decisive battle.
Later in his
intellectual career, however, Clausewitz began to pay more attention to the idea
of the ‘Limited War’. Limited wars are characterized by one or both sides
limiting their political aims – by demanding territory, for example, rather
than regime overthrow.
With limited
aims, both sides operate under cost-benefit analyses which lead to points where
further sacrifice ceases to be worth it. Surrender is therefore not based on
whether one is able to resist, but instead on reaching that point where achieving
the aim would cost more than one is willing to spend. Limited War thus offers
the possibility of winning without having to mobilize one’s entire force for
decisive battle, and Corbett now outlines a method where such an outcome can be
achieved.
The Limited Form
What Corbett
calls the ‘Limited Form’ is based on the advantages of adopting an offensive or
defensive posture. By switching between the two, the Limited Form raises the
enemy’s cost of winning without extra input from our side, ideally sending him
over the point at which he would prefer surrender to fighting on.
Corbett sees
the offensive as being the ‘more effective form of war’. Only through the
offense can one actually induce changes to the strategic status quo. Operationally, the offensive side also possesses the
initiative, and with that the ability to deploy and maneuver in such a way as
to concentrate the largest force against the enemy’s weakest point.
Corbett
characterizes the defensive, on the other hand, as the ‘stronger form of war’. Operationally,
defenders have the benefit of time, force-multipliers, beneficial supply lines,
and the second-mover advantage of acting after the attacker has made his move. The
more an offensive progresses, the more it exhausts itself; by contrast, the
defense’s advantages only get stronger the more one is pushed back. To use
Corbett’s analogy, it is easier to keep money in one’s pocket than to take it
from another man’s; an attacker must be stronger, faster or stealthier than the
defender in order to prevail.
The
following illustrates how the Limited Form can switch between offensive and
defensive to produce positive and cost-effective results. Suppose two states are
in a limited dispute, in this case over territory owned by the defender. The
attacker begins with an operational offensive, utilizes his advantages of
initiative and surprise, concentrates against the defender, breaks through and
establishes himself on the territory before the defender can react. Now the
attacker has shifted the status quo
in his favor and is on the strategic offensive. He now switches to the
operational defensive, takes advantages of local force-multipliers, and
prepares to hold what he has taken.
The defender,
with the goal to restore the pre-war status
quo, is now on the strategic defensive. In order to do that, he now has to
take the operational offensive, which means he will be going up against the
‘stronger form of war’. All else being equal, this means that the defender has
to spend more, risk more and likely lose more, simply to get back to where he
once was.
The same
territory now demands significantly more from the defender than it did from the
attacker. Should the difference be large enough, an inferior attacker can send a
superior defender beyond the point where continued resistance is worthwhile. If
the defender decides to go on the offensive with superior forces, he runs the
risk of exhausting himself against an inferior force and tossing away any
numerical advantages he once had.
The Limited Form
applied in a Limited War therefore offers a way for smaller forces to win over
larger forces, and for inferior nations to achieve positive results over superior
nations. In this sense it is a cost-effective strategy and Corbett sees it as a
pillar of the ‘British Way of War’.
Limited War: Clausewitz and Escalation
So if the
Limited Form is so effective, then why isn’t it the go-to strategy for every
situation?
The answer lies in the concept of
escalation. Remember that Limited Wars are so-called because both sides have
decided or coordinated to limit their war aims. Clausewitz sees this restraint
as ultimately a political decision and nothing stops leaders from getting rid
of them if they want to.
Unsurprisingly, the losing side is always
tempted to escalate in a bid to turn the tables, expanding the scope of the war
into new theaters where he has the initiative and can use the Limited Form against
the winning side.
Clausewitz saw that this logic of
escalation eventually causes all Limited Wars to become Unlimited, with aims so
unrestrained that they approximate the conditions of Absolute War. Indeed, the
losing side can escalate to Unlimited War immediately by ignoring the territory
held by the attacker and directly striking his homeland. In either case, the
side that is still fighting a Limited War when the enemy has removed all
restraints is simply courting disaster, as the long record of failure against
Napoleon showed.
This is not to say that escalation to
Unlimited War is inevitable. But given the high stakes involved, states in
Limited War have to act as if Unlimited War is a constant possibility. The only
real way to solve this conundrum decisively would be to remove the enemy’s
ability to resist, which means reverting back to the Clausewitzian ideal of
targeting the enemy force. Escalation therefore threatens to remove the
rationale for using the Limited Form in war.
Limited War: Corbett and Strategic
Isolation
If ‘Limited
War’ and ‘Limited Form’ are to be of practical value, Corbett must find
situations where escalation effectively cannot happen. Here, he lays out two
possibilities:
The first
possibility is where the aim in dispute is of limited political importance:
this is Clausewitz’s idea of limited aims. For Corbett, however, only colonies
or other sparsely-populated overseas possessions are really that insignificant.
The others are not only more materially valuable, they also tend to be infused
with immaterial elements such as national pride, historical claims and so on, greatly
inflating their value and promoting escalation.
The second
possibility is where the aim is strategically isolated. This in itself consists
of two things: firstly, the power to secure the homeland from an enemy’s
unlimited strike, and secondly, the power to isolate the aim itself to deny the
possibility of enemy reinforcement, Combined, this means that if the enemy
wants to escalate, he is unable the enemy is unable to bring extra force to
stave off defeat even if he wanted to.
Corbett
claims that Continental states are connected to each other over land and
therefore are never truly able to strategically isolate themselves from enemy
escalation. By contrast, however, the most straightforward form of strategic
isolation can be performed by a maritime state that controls the seas. Defensively,
a maritime state that controls home waters is effectively defended from the
threat of enemy invasion and no longer needs to mobilize to meet such a threat.
It can therefore mobilize and deploy its land force in accordance with its
priorities, rather than what the isolated enemy can potentially do.
Offensively,
strategic isolation gives the isolator full possession of the initiative, able
to redistribute and concentrate forces at will, while the isolated side is
denied the chance to reinforce vulnerable fronts or to distract the isolator
through the opening up of new fronts. Given the circumstances, the isolated
side can only hope that his existing deployments can fend off all potential
challenges, which is a tall order indeed.
Strategic
isolation through sea control represents another pillar of the ‘British Way of
War’. By controlling the relevant seas, Britain was spared the cost of
defending itself from unlimited invasion, prevented the enemy from bringing
superior force to entire theaters, and created conditions for true Limited War
where local superiority and the application of the Limited Form would bring
about victory. Without controlling the seas, as happened during the American
Revolutionary War, Britain was deprived of the ability to strategically isolate
theaters and soon found itself unable to deal with the consequent enemy
escalation.
But more
often than not, strategic isolation allowed Britain to win wars without the
force and cost outlays of Continental rivals. The resulting cost-efficiencies
allowed Britain to invest more into itself, its trade, and its Empire, fueling
its rise to prominence.
The Limited Form in an Unlimited War
Through strategic
isolation and the Limited Form, the ‘British Way of War’ proposes a method for inferior
states to win Limited Wars. Corbett now seeks to apply this method to Unlimited
Wars, where the war aims demand the destruction of the enemy’s ability to
resist. According to Clausewitzian Absolute War theory, such an achievement
would require the annihilation of the enemy force under a strategy of decisive
battle.
In the
broadest sense, Corbett does not dispute this. He does, however, propose that
one can use Strategic Isolation and the Limited Form to overthrow the enemy’s
ability to resist without having to mobilize and match his force strength.
There are
two ways that Corbett’s strategy can be used to win Unlimited Wars. The first
way involves finding a prestige objective so symbolic that its capture would
generate significant pressures for surrender. Strategy then becomes a matter of
isolating the objective and then using the Limited Form to force the enemy into
unfavorable match-ups. Corbett takes the Crimean War as an example, where the
entire contest over Near Eastern hegemony crystallized into a fight over
Sevastopol, the eventual fall of which compelled the Russians to admit defeat despite
retaining potent forces.
Corbett
characterizes the other way as ‘Wars Limited by Contingent’, where an
expeditionary force uses the Limited Form to overstretch the enemy and
advantage allies in coalition warfare. First, a selected theater is
strategically isolated via sea power, limiting the enemy’s ability to bring his
full force to bear and effectively turning it into a Limited War. An
expeditionary force lands and applies the Limited Form, forcing the enemy to
attack defensive positions in order to recover the strategic status quo. Then, once the opponent has
been sufficiently exhausted, the expeditionary force goes back on the
operational offensive, routs that portion of enemy strength, and repeats the
whole process again. This, Corbett claims, was what happened in the Peninsular
War against Napoleon.
Even at a suboptimal
level, coastal descents using the Limited Method represent a disruption that
the enemy has to spend outsize resources containing. In fact, the mere threat
of such action may be enough to force the enemy to divert scarce resources into
passive garrison work. Napoleon implied as much when he grumbled that 50,000 English
in Kent could paralyze 300,000 of his army.
Usage of the
Limited Form not only weakens the enemy, it also strengthens the inferior
state’s hand against coalition allies. A state which furnishes an inferior
contingent to participate in decisive battles has little say over coalition
strategy or at the negotiating table. The Limited Form offers a way for said
contingent to make an independent and outsize contribution without the corresponding
cost that other allies pay.
All in all, in
the absence of a symbolic target, the enemy will still have to be brought low
through decisive battle. However, even when the aims demand the enemy’s
overthrow, the ‘British Way of War’ shows that inferior forces or states can
still contribute in a significant and cost-effective way towards victory.
Conclusion
Corbett’s
‘British Way of War’, encompassing the concepts of sea control, strategic
isolation, and the Limited Form, sees maritime states utilizing their
geographic advantage to wage Limited Wars in a cost-effective fashion. Doing so
not only allows them to hold off larger forces with smaller ones, it spares
them the cost of raising and risking large armies in the first place.
Corbett’s
focus was on explaining British success, but his precepts also apply to other
maritime states such as Japan and the United States. Further theoretical
developments on Corbettian theory have continued as the dangers of unrestrained
escalation and the emergence of compartmentalized wars within broader
superpower rivalry have spurred research into Limited War.
Unfortunately
for Corbett, his strategy came too late for WWI. Influenced by the
Continentalist outlook, Britain raised a mass-conscript army that ground down
the Germans after 4 years, but at the cost of 800,000 lives and significant
debt. Corbett bemoaned the adoption of such an inefficient strategy instead of one
where the French and Russians soaked up the bulk of the casualties while the
British eroded German strength by threatening the Baltic and picking off the
Central Powers.
That is not
to say that Corbett’s theory is without criticism. His interpretation of
Clausewitz assumes states will dispassionately weigh costs and benefits in war
rather than being swung to extremes through chance and passion. It is unclear
if strategic isolation of the homeland is even possible nowadays with airpower
and missiles, and of course, Corbett’s theories are tailored towards
conventional state-to-state, army-versus-army wars rather than the asymmetric
variants more commonly seen today.
In the end,
Corbett’s insights remain useful as a guide for maritime states, represent a
valuable development on Clausewitz’s theories and also serve as a link between
Clausewitzian-era Unlimited War and post-Clausewizian Limited War.
Thanks for
watching the video!
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