== 1) Reason for Delay ==
Spent 1 month trying to learn Adobe After Effects, then another month trying to outsource the video work to a freelancer. And juggling some (actual) work at the same time.
== 2) Primary Literature Review ==
"Sea Power 1660-1783" is NOT a good introduction to Mahanian strategy. Chapter 1 - the influential part of the book - is policy advocacy, NOT strategy. The rest of the book is a dense historical narrative that lumps tactical, operational and strategic observations together. A better primary source for Mahanian strategy would be a compilation of Mahan's lectures: I recommend "Mahan on Naval Warfare" and "The Interest of America in Sea Power".
== 3) Secondary Literature Review ==
The US Government's "Guide to the Career and Work of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan", a compilation of dissertations/policy-strategy documents written by military scholars, is an excellent review and assessment of most aspects of Mahanian theory, especially examining its relevance to 21stC warfare. BUT it is a massive read (c.900 pages if I recall), and the poor presentation of the Kindle version doesn't help.
Mahan's chapter in "Makers of Modern Strategy" outlines Mahanian operational + strategic thinking well enough BUT I think it falls back into 2 cliches when it critiques Mahanian grand strategy: 1) Assuming Mahan says that states can prosper ONLY through maritime access (rather than maritime being a more efficient way of doing so); and 2) Insisting that decisive naval battle is the core element of Mahanian grand strategy (when Mahanian commerce-denial can probably be achieved nowadays without resorting to fleet or even military battles e.g. A2/AD, weaponizing US Financial System access etc.)
I regret not being able to read Jon Tetsuro Sumida's "Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command" before finalizing the script.
== 4) Thoughts on the Video ==
A key point I hoped to make in this video was to separate Mahanian thought from 'Trafalgar-ism' (the desire for 'glorious' combat), the combination of which led naval strategymakers (e.g. pre-Jutland UK and WWII Japan) to identify Mahan not just with decisive battle, BUT battleship duels. Imho, the logical reasoning behind Mahanian strategy seems to indicate that decisive battle ISN'T the core Mahanian concept - if there had been a better way of imposing commerce-denial, a different operational template would have been recommended (as demonstrated by Corbett's modifications).
That said, the key flaw in Mahanian strategy is its instinctive dismissal (NOT just Mahan BUT Corbett too) of the strategic impact of commerce-raiding. In a sense, what Mahanians dislike about raiding as a strategy is its inherent uncertainty: a proper enemy will always have the resources to counter raiding, so when you raid you're ALWAYS uncertain whether this time, he'll be able to counter your threat. (Most) Strategies abhor uncertainty, BUT that DOESN'T mean that uncertain strategies NEVER produce gains. WWI and WWII German U-Boat warfare had periods where they delivered strategic shocks to UK - and especially so for WWII US sub warfare against Japan. Even in the Age of Sail, US privateering during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 imposed enough financial costs on UK merchants (rising insurance costs) to deliver strategic gains in terms of increasing war weariness. In seeking the 100% foolproof commerce-denial strategy through sea control, Mahanians might have overlooked the potential of a less-perfect/reliable alternative.
One point that modern-day scholars love to point out about 19thC theories is that they ignore the role that militaries can play in peacetime/low-level conflict. So for example, Mahanian concentration (even in its nuanced version) can therefore be suboptimal because it would mean removing a source of deterrence/policing etc. from a region. I think this is a criticism whose merit lies mainly at the operational or tactical level - clearly Mahanian strategy is an ideal NOT reality, and you're talking to people who were masters of 'gunboat diplomacy', after all.
Lastly, the application of Mahanian naval thought to air power is generally, from what I've read, limited to Chapter 1 of Sea Power - which, as a policy recommendation, is probably applicable to any specialized line of work. BUT on a strategic level, it's difficult to imagine an economy whose efficiency would be drastically impacted by the denial of air transport, itself an energy-inefficient mode of transport. The Mahanian-ness of space would probably depend on 2 things: 1) the efficiency gains from interplanetary trade (more gains = more Mahanian), and 2) the availability of other transport mediums (e.g. teleportation).
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